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that wants everything the right stands for to be driven by nefariousness, smallness, or greed, and everything we do to be generously minded and good, an impulse that casts Us and Them in seamless and opposing moral political universes.
Hall's challenge to break with monological, totalizing, and linear accounts, then, is impeded not simply by an intellectual hangover (from an episteme in which power was figured as unified, systematic, and purpose ful) but also by a difficulty in left desire. This is a difficulty we can redress only through a willingness to reckon with the incoherent, multiply sourced, and unsystematic nature of political orders and rationalities on the one hand, and to avow identification and affinity with some of what we excori ate on the other. If, for example, many on the left share the rightist ambi tion to secure cultural and political hegemony and impose a moral order, such anti-democratic impulses bear careful scrutiny even, nay especially, as all sides adorn themselves in the robes of democracy.
The problematic of this essay is well-suited to the analytics of dreamwork.
This is the problematic of thinking together American neoconservatism a fierce moral-political rationality-and neoliberalism-a market-political rationality that exceeds its peculiarly American instantiation and that does not align exclusively with any political persuasion. The aim is not to under stand the project of the American right tout court, as if there were such a unified endeavor or entity behind it, but to apprehend how these two ratio nalities, themselves composite, inadvertently converge at crucial points to 
Thinking Neoliberalism and Neoconservatism Together
We begin with a set of formal concerns about the relation between a neoliberalism contoured by globalized capital but given a particular twist in each local context where it dwells, and a distinctly American neoconser vatism that also has cousins in other fundamentalist and religiously inflected responses to late modernity but is homegrown and internally diverse even in the American context. How does a rationality that is expressly amoral at the level of both ends and means (neoliberalism) inter sect with one that is expressly moral and regulatory (neoconservatism)?5
How does a project that empties the world of meaning, that cheapens and deracinates life and openly exploits desire, intersect one centered on fixing and enforcing meanings, conserving certain ways of life, and repressing and regulating desire? How does support for governance modeled on the firm and a normative social fabric of self-interest marry or jostle against support for governance modeled on church authority and a normative social fabric of self-sacrifice and long-term filial loyalty, the very fabric shredded by unbridled capitalism? And what might be the role of evangelical Christianity on one side and hyper-demonized enemies to the American state on the other in facilitating this marriage? Again, the search here is not for a single or coherent logic, but for an understanding of the effects of two disparate streams of rationality in producing the contemporary landscape of political intelligibility and possibility. This involves discerning sites of social and psychological vulnerability, exploitability, or orientation that they respectively trade or draw on in one another. What effects of power, legitimacy, or authority consequent to one rationality become root soil for the other? As the figure of dreamwork would suggest, the aim is to discover what might appear as logical contradiction at the level of ideas to be grasped as partially and unsystematically symbiotic at the level of political subjectivity, and thus to depart from analyses that either distinguish values talk from material interests or reprise notions of "false consciousness."
The essay first maps select elements of neoliberalism and neoconser vatism, then considers their collisions and convergences, and concludes with a brief reflection on how fundamentalist Christianity as an emergent idiom of public life compounds the de-democratizing force of these two rationalities.
Neoliberalism
I have argued elsewhere that in order to comprehend neoliberalism's political and cultural effects, it must be conceived of as more than a set of free market economic policies that dismantle welfare states and privatize public services in the North, make wreckage of efforts at democratic sovereignty or economic self-direction in the South, and intensify income disparities everywhere. Certainly neoliberalism comprises these effects, but as a polit ical rationality, it also involves a specific and consequential organization of the social, the subject, and the state.6 A political rationality is not equivalent to an ideology stemming from or masking an economic reality, nor is it merely a spillover effect of the economic on the political or the social.
Rather, as Foucault inflected the term, a political rationality is a specific form of normative political reason organizing the political sphere, gover nance practices, and citizenship.7 A political rationality governs the sayable, the intelligible, and the truth criteria of these domains. Thus, while neolib eral political rationality is based on a certain conception of the market, its organization of governance and the social is not merely the result of leak age from the economic to other spheres but rather of the explicit imposition of a particular form of market rationality on these spheres. Neoliberalism as a form of political reasoning that articulates the nature and meaning of the political, the social, and the subject must be underscored because it is through this form and articulation that its usurpation of other more democ ratic rationalities occurs.
What are the salient features of neoliberal political rationality?8 First, in contrast with classical economic liberalism (and, it is important to remind American readers, the "liberalism" of neoliberalism refers to economic rather than political liberalism), neoliberalism is not confined to an expressly economic sphere, nor does it cast the market as natural and self regulating even in the economic sphere. Part of what makes neoliberalism "neo" is that it depicts free markets, free trade, and entrepreneurial ratio nality as achieved and normative, as promulgated through law and through social and economic policy-not simply as occurring by dint of nature.
Second, neoliberalism casts the political and social spheres both as appro priately dominated by market concerns and as themselves organized by market rationality. That is, more than simply facilitating the economy, the state itself must construct and construe itself in market terms, as well as develop policies and promulgate a political culture that figures citizens exhaustively as rational economic actors in every sphere of life. Familiar here are the many privatization and outsourcing schemes for welfare, edu cation, prisons, the police, and the military, but this aspect of neoliberalism also entails a host of policies that figure and produce citizens as individual entrepreneurs and consumers whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for "self-care"-their ability to provide for their own needs and service their own ambitions, whether as welfare recipients, medical patients, consumers of pharmaceuticals, university students, or workers in ephemeral occupations. Third, neoliberal political rationality produces governance cri teria along the same lines, that is, criteria of productivity and profitability, with the consequence that governance talk increasingly becomes market Christians, chamber musicians turned Sovietologists, political theory pro fessors turned policy wonks, angry white men, and righteous black ones. In short, neoconservatism is born out of a literally unholy alliance, one that is only unevenly and opportunistically religious, although we will later take up religion's importance in facilitating neoconservatism's appeal to a popular base, and especially in constructing a reception for its authoritarianism.
In Anne Norton's words, what unites the neoconservatives is the desire for a strong state and a state that will put its strength to use....
[They] would have that state ally itself with-and empower-corporations. Neoconservatives reject the vulgarity of mass culture. They deplore the decadence of artists and intellectuals. They, though not always religious themselves, ally themselves with religion and religious crusades. They encourage family values and the praise of older forns of family life, where women occupy themselves with children, cooking and the church, and men take on the burdens of manliness. They see in war and the preparation for war the restoration of private virtue and public spirt.... Above all, Irving Kristol writes, neoconservatism calls for a revival of patriotism, a strong military, and an expansionist foreign policy."9
While the disparate elements of neoconservatism (which Irving Kristol calls an "orientation" rather than a "movement") at times seem bound together primarily by shared objects of loathing-the United Nations, But beyond the scandals and policy conflicts are the routine effects of neoliberal economics, governance, and political rationality on everyday life, effects that neoconservative commitments chafe against. These include the destruction of small businesses and local commerce; the elimination of jobs and union-secured wages, benefits, and workplace protections; and the gutting of federal-and state-funded infrastructure (education, transportation, emergency services) that sustains families and towns. Here, the rich-get-richer dimensions of every aspect of neoliberalism run counter to neoconservatism's necessary reliance on a working-and lower-middle-class populist base, and especially its cultivation of a traditional masculinity and family structure undercut by falling real wages and depleted infrastructures and social services. And the upright, patriotic, moral, and self-sacrificing neoconserv ative subject is partially undone by a neoliberal subject inured against altru ism and wholly in thrall to its own interest: the neoliberal rationality of strict means-ends calculations and need satisfaction (and the making of states, citizens, and subjects in that image) clashes with the neoconservative project of producing a moral subject and moral order against the effects of the market in culture and oriented to the repression and sublimation rather than the satisfaction of desire.
Perhaps most importantly, neoliberalism figures a future in which cultural and national borders are largely erased, in which all relations, attachments, and endeavors are submitted to a monetary nexus, while neoconservatism scrambles to re-articulate and police cultural and national borders, the sacred, and the singular through discourses of patriotism, religiosity, and the West. Neoliberalism looks forward to a global order contoured by a uni versalized market rationality in which cultural difference is at most a com modity, and nation-state boundaries are but markers of culinary differences and provincial legal arrangements, while American neoconservatism looks backward to a national and nationalist order contoured by a set of moral and political attachments inflected by the contingent ambition of Empire. More generally, neoliberalism confidently identifies itself with the future, and in producing itself as normal rather than adversarial does not acknowledge any alternative futures. Neoconservatism, on the other hand, identifies itself as the guardian and advocate of a potentially vanishing past and present, and a righteous bulwark against loss, and constitutes itself a warring against serious contenders for an alternative futurity, those it identifies as "liberal ism" at home and "barbarism" abroad.
But here it is important to remember that neoconservatism is also born in part as a response to capitalism's erosion of meaning and morality, and that the founding neoconservatives, while opposed to communism as a political and social form, were rarely ardent free marketeers. To the con trary, in 1978, Irving Kristol, the original and iconic neocon, famously gave "two cheers" for capitalism for the freedom and wealth it accrues for most people, withholding the third cheer because "consumer societies are empty of moral meaning if not forthrightly nihilistic." So the conundrum of neocon servatism's concern to preserve or re-weave the moral fabric that corporate domination shreds is actually a foundation stone of neoconservatism, at least among its intellectuals. However enthusiastic about corporate wealth today, and however close to it socially and politically, no neocon is a pure neolib eral, although many endorse neoliberalism to the point of making difficulty for themselves, and speak a strange verbal brew that mixes the idioms of moral rectitude and entrepreneurial calculation. Still, "corporate responsi openly engaged in promoting a civic religion that links family form, con sumer practices, political passivity, and patriotism; and openly and aggres sively imperial. Each of these reformulations is significant unto itself, but together they establish a relation of mutual reinforcement between newly legitimated statism in domestic and international politics. In addition, although neoconservatism, like neoliberalism, wraps itself in the mantle of "liberty" and "democracy," neoconservative political pro jects displace the key principles and assumptions long associated with con stitutional democracy. Equality is not a value to be found anywhere in the neocon or neoliberal universe; to the contrary, egalitarianism is understood as a "treacherous demagogic appeal," to which "a property-owning and tax paying population will, in time become less vulnerable."24 Not only does neoconservatism figure redistribution as a wrong against the middle class, but also the political rationality of neoliberalism is expressly about winners and losers based on entrepreneurial skill, and the political rationality of words, "to be underpaid and overweight" as long as it is also cooed to by the party of the rich as "the real America."25
Apart from egalitarianism, civil liberties, fair elections, and the rule of law also lose their standing at the conjuncture of neoliberalism and neoconservatism, becoming instruments or symbols rather than treasures, indeed becoming wholly desacralized even as they are rhetorically wielded as beacons of democracy. Neoliberalism doesn't require them, and the neo conservative priority of moral values and state power trumps them.
What this suggests is that the moralism, statism, and authoritarianism of neoconservatism are profoundly enabled by neoliberal rationality, even as neoconservatism aims to limit and supplement some of neoliberalism's effects, and even as the two rationalities are not concordant. Neoliberalism does not simply produce a set of problems that neoconservatism addresses or, as critics often claim, operate as neoconservatism's corporate/economic plank. Rather, neoliberal political rationality, which knows no political party, has inadvertently prepared the ground for profoundly anti-democratic political ideas and practices to take root in the culture and the subject. This is what permits neoconservatism to become more than a contestable political ideology or agenda whose star might rise or fall according to economic indi cators, immigration politics, or success in imperial wars. Neoconservatism sewn in the soil prepared by neoliberalism breeds a new political form, a specific modality of governance and citizenship, one whose incompatibil ity with even formal democratic practices and institutions does not spur a legitimation crisis because of the neoliberal devaluation of these practices and institutions that neoconservatism then consecrates.
This argument varies not only from those that assimilate neoliberalism to neoconservatism but also from those, such as that advanced by Thomas Frank in What's the Matter with Kansas, which treat neoconservatives as duping the working poor and middle class with insincere "values talk," using their complicity and votes to pursue a corporate agenda directly at odds with their interests.26 Frank argues that neocon leaders who "talk Christ but walk corporate" mobilize a working-class constituency on the basis of moral issues never delivered on but which keep this constituency bound to them. Hence the episodic revisitation of proposed constitutional amendments and other mostly doomed legislation to ban flag burning, abortion, homosexual unions, stem cell research, or the required teaching of evolution as science and commitments to secularism in public schools.
While Frank is clearly correct about the neocon leadership's hand waving over such issues and its pursuit of policies at odds with the economic wel fare of its working-and middle-class base, his analysis assumes rather than queries the "interests" he imputes to this base. Neoliberal de-democratization produces a subject who may have no such interests, who may be more desirous of its own subjection and complicit in its subordination than any democratic subject could be said to be.27 That is, even as Frank explains This conversion of socially, economically, and politically produced prob lems into consumer items depoliticizes what has been historically produced, and it especially depoliticizes capitalism itself. Moreover, as neoliberal political rationality devolves both political problems and solutions from public to private, it further dissipates political or public life: the project of navigating the social becomes entirely one of discerning, affording, and procuring a personal solution to every socially produced problem. This is depoliticization on an unprecedented level: the economy is tailored to it, citizenship is organized by it, the media are dominated by it, and the politi cal rationality of neoliberalism frames and endorses it.
Thus, the much-discussed commitment of neoliberalism to "privatiza tion" has ramifications that exceed the outsourcing of police forces, prisons, welfare, militaries, and schools on one side, and the corporate buyout of public endeavors and institutions on the other. Privatization as a value and practice penetrates deep into the culture and the citizen-subject. If we have a problem, we look to a product to solve it; indeed, a good deal of our lives is devoted to researching, sharing, procuring, and upgrading these solutions.
At the same time, as a quick tour of any "public" university or an hour of lis tening to "public" radio makes clear, distinct thresholds between the corpo rate and public domains are eroding, leaving only occasional conflict of interest violations, fought out at relatively legalistic levels, in their wake.
The Governed Citizen
As neoliberalism produces the citizen on the model of entrepreneur and consumer, it simultaneously makes citizens available to extensive gover nance and heavy administrative authority. We have already seen that neolib erals themselves have a keen appreciation of the production of certain kinds of subjects and behaviors through market incentives and deterrents. But 37. An anonymous reader of this manuscript underscored the significance of this message being attached to cars by magnets rather than adhesives.
In the scheme of neoliberal culture, s/he noted, "showing commitment to our boys (and girls) in uniform is one thing; tarnishing the car with sticky stuff is another."
38. More than a few have argued for the language of fascism to describe the current con protests, and workshops that have taken place under the sign of anti-globalization or "Another world is possible" over the past decade. These are only to be applauded but do not (yet?) add up to either a vision for democratic governance or a strategy for democratizing existing powers.
As so many radical movements, parties, and leaders have learned over the years, the difference between protest and strategies for taking power, let alone governing, is quite significant. 
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